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 Registered Member #1283 Joined: Fri Sep 28 2007, 12:35amPosts: 4466 | ktu mund te shkrujm per filozofet e medhenj. biografin, punen, idete e tyre etj. sot nuk kam shum kohe as nerva me shkru gjate apo me kerku me ba copy and paste. shpejt kam me postu prep te kjo teme. | ||
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Miss.Felicity!   Registered Member #514 Joined: Thu Feb 15 2007, 10:58amPosts: 36201 | Biografia dhe veprat e Nietzsches Friedrich Wilhem Nietzsche është një nga filozofët më të mëdhenj gjerman të shek. të 19. Ai ka qenë një kritik i bindur i Krishtërimit, idealist gjerman i Feminizmit dhe modernizmit në përgjithësi. Ai konsiderohet si një mjeshtër i vërtetë i aforizmave filozofike të krijuara në formë eksperimentale. Për këtë arsye, ai është urryer, adhuruar, keq-interpretuar dhe ndoshta mbetet edhe sot e kësaj dite filozofi më i vështirë për t’u kuptuar. Nietzsche ka lindur me 15 tetor te vitit 1844 ne Ryken te Lajpcigut, ne Saksoni. Ai u rrit ne gjirin e nje familjeje protestante, ndersa i ati ishte prift. Ky i fundit vdiq kur Friedrich ishte vetem 4 vjec, pasi vuante nga nje semundje mendore. Se bashku me te emen dhe motren, Elizabeth, ai u transferua ne Naumburg ku do te jetonte per tete vite me radhe. Friedrich ishte nje adoleshent teper kurioz, nje nxenes i shkelqyer dhe ne momentin e perballjes me besimin fetar, nisi te anonte nga ateizmi. Ai studioi filozofine ne Universitetin e Lajpcigut ku do te hasej me veprat e Shopenhaurit, te cilat do te perbenin dhe pikenisjen e frymezimit te tij filozofik. Ne vitin 1865, ne moshen 24 vjecare Nietzsche emerohet profesor ne Universitetin e Baselit dhe perfiton nënshtetesi zviceriane. Nje vit me pare, kishte njohur kompozitorin Richard Wagner, me te cilin do te kishte nje miqesi te gjate, por kjo nuk e ndaloi ta kritikonte si perfaqesues te kultures me dekadente ne bote, asaj gjermane. Ne kete periudhe studion filozofine antike greke, ne veçanti veprat e filozofeve para-sokrate, Heraklitit dhe Empedokles. Ne vitin 1870 Nietzsche sherbeu si asitent mjekesor ne Luften Franko-Pruse dhe ishte deshmitar i traumave dhe mjerimit njerezor, per me teper u sëmur nga dizinteria dhe difteria, pasojat e se cilave do t’i vuante gjate gjithe jetes. Pas rikthimit ne Bazel, ne vend qe te pushonte nisi te shkruante pambarimisht, duke shtyre fuqine e tij mendore ne limit. Ne 1872 publikoi vepren e tij te pare te famshme “Lindja e tragjedise’. Ne vitin 1879 braktis mesimdhenien per shkak te problemeve shendetesore dhe ne dekaden ne vazhdim e kaloi kohen ne Venecia, Torino dhe Nisa. Tre vite me pas, bie ne dashuri me Lou fon Salome, por kjo e fundit refuzoi kerkesen e tij per martese. Po ne 1882 Nietzsche nis te shkruaje kryevepren e tij “Keshtu foli Zarathustra’( Also spracht Zarathustra ), e cila publikohet tre vite me vone. Ne 1888 transferohet ne Torino, ku dhe do te perfundoje veprat ‘Perendimi I idhujve’ dhe Ecce Homo – Si behet njeriu ai qe eshte. Filozofia e Nietzsches nis me trajtimin e filozofise dhe artit te Greqise Antike, ne disfavor te klasicizmit, te cilin e veshtronte si nje afirmim te vizionit te arsyeshem dhe si per pasoje perfaqesues te dekadences. Ne vecanti tragjedia greke eshte interpretuar si nje shprehi e impulsit jetesor, apo sic shprehet Nietzsche i ‘momentit dionisiak’. Nice kritikon ashper vlerat morale te shoqerise dhe altruizmi te cilat ne fakt mohojne vete jeten. Sipas tij njeriu duhet te perjetoje edhe dhimbjen pasi ‘çfaredo nuk te vret, te ben me te fuqishem’. Koncepti i njohur i Nices ‘ vullneti per fuqi’ luan nje rol kryesor ne filozofine e tij, duke u shprehur se‘ eshte esenca e ekzistences njerezore, sikur t’i thuash jetes po!’, pra afirmimi i saj. Nietzsche mendonte se lideret fetare perdorin besimin dhe moralin per te skllaveruar njerezimin. Sipas tij, koncepti ‘fuqia e vullnetit’ lejon tejkalimin e njeriut jo eliminimin e tij, pra braktisjen e idhujve dekadente dhe shpreses per nje jete ne boten e pertejme dhe pranimin e jetes ashtu siç eshte ajo. Pra ndyshe nga keqinterpretimet e filozofise se tij, mbinjeriu nichean nuk eshte nje njeri i gjithefuqishem, por nje qenie qe duhet te evoluoje lirshem per te tejkaluar vetveten ( "..njeriu eshte nje ure dhe jo nje qellim." – kjo eshte edhe parabola e Zarathustres. Pikerisht ketu nis komploti nazist, i cili perdori me tjeter kuptim filozofine e Nietzsches. Shkrimet e tij persa i perket fuqise, dobesise, feminizmit dhe fese u bene aksioma te nazizmit ne perhapjen e doktrines se tyre totalitare, nderkohe qe vete Nietzsche ishte kunder anti-semitizmit dhe denimit me vdekje. Nje nga theniet me te famshme ne histori, ‘Zoti ka vdekur’, eshte thene pikerisht nga Nietzsche, por kuptimi nuk eshte aspak ai i supozuar, Nietzsche flet per kontemporanet e tij, ipokrizia e se cileve le te kuptohet se ata ne fakt jetojne ‘sikur Zoti te kishte vdekur’, sipas Nietzsche‘..ka ekzistuar vetem nje i krishtere i vertete, dhe Ai vdiq mbi Kryq’. Me 3 janar te vitit 1889, teksa ndodhej ne Sheshin Karlo Alberto, ne Torino, Nietzsche peson krizen e pare nervore duke shfaqur mendime delirante duke u vete-quajtur Krishti apo Dionisi, perendia greke e defrimit. Semundja e papritur e tij eshte debat me vete, disa mendojne se e ka trasheguar nga babai i tij, ndersa ndikimi ose jo i semundjes ne krijimtarine filozofike ndahet ne opinione te ndryshme. Fridrich Nietsche kaloi dy vitet e fundit te jetes se tij ne erresire mendore dhe u perkujdes nga motra e tij Elizabeta. Filozofi I madh u nda nga jeta me 25 gusht te vitit 1900, ne Weimar. Trashigimia e Nietzsches Filozofia e Nietzsches ka ndikuar ne kulturen dhe disa nga mjeshtrit e shekullit te 20, perfshi Thomas Man, Andre Gide, Herman Hesse, Zigmund Freud, Martin Heidegger apo Emil Cioran. Fatkeqesisht rreth viteve 20 filozofia e tij u intyerpretua ne menyre barbare nga nazizmi gjerman dhe fashizmi italian, dhe per me teper te ndihmuar nga e motra e cila fallsifikoi disa nga tekstet. Tragjedia e vertete nicheane qendron ne faktin se keto intrepretime te gabuara vazhdojne te ekzistojne edhe sot e kesaj dite. Krijimtaria letrare e Nietzsches Shkrime dhe filozofi Aus meinem Leben, 1858 Über Musik, 1858 Napoleon III als Praesident, 1862 Fatum und Geschichte, 1862 Willensfreiheit und Fatum, 1862 Kann der Neidische je wahrhaft glücklich sein?, 1863 Über Stimmungen, 1864 Mein Leben, 1864 Homer und die klassische Philologie, 1868 Über die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten Fünf Vorreden zu fünf ungeschriebenen Büchern, 1872 perbere nga: . Über das Pathos der Wahrheit (Mbi patorsin e se vertetes) . Gedanken über die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten (Mendime mbi te ardhmen e Institucioneve tona arsimore ) . Der griechische Staat (Shteti grek) . Das Verhältnis der Schopenhauerischen Philosophie zu einer deutschen Cultur (Marredhenia midis filozofise Schopenhaueriane dhe kultures gjermane) . Homer's Wettkampf (Kundeshtimi i Homerit) Die Geburt der Tragödie, 1872 ( Lindja e tragjedise) Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinn, 1873 (Mbi te verteten dhe fallsitetin ne nje kuptim me moralizues) Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen (Filozofia ne eren tragjike te grekeve) Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen (Meditimet perfundimtare) perbere nga: . David Strauss: der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller, 1873 (David Strauss: Rrefyesi dhe shkrimtari ) . Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben, 1874 (Mbi perdorimin dhe abuzimin e Historise per Jeten ) . Schopenhauer als Erzieher, 1874 (Schopenhauer si edukues) . Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, 1876 Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, 1878 ( Njerezor, teper njerezor) Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche, 1879 (Opinione te perzjera dhe aksioma Der Wanderer und sein Schatten, 1879 (Udhetari dhe hija e tij) Morgenröte, 1881 (Agimi) Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, 1882, 1887 Also sprach Zarathustra, 1883-5 ( Keshtu foli Zarathustra) Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 1886 (Pertej se mires dhe se keqes) Zur Genealogie der Moral, 1887 (Mbi gjenealogjine e moralit) Der Fall Wagner, 1888 (Çeshtja Wagner) Götzen-Dämmerung, 1888 (Perendimi i idhujve) Der Antichrist, 1888 (Antikrishti) Ecce Homo, 1888 (Ecce Homo. Si behet njeriu ai qe eshte) Nietzsche contra Wagner, 1888 (Nietzsche kunder Wagner) Der Wille zur Macht, publikuar filimisht ne vitin 1901 ( Vullneti per fuqi, nje koleksion I pezgjedhur shenimesh, publikuar pas vdekjes se autorit) Filologji De fontibus Laertii Diogenii Über die alten hexametrischen Nomen Über die Apophthegmata und ihre Sammler Über die literarhistorischen Quellen des Suidas Über die Quellen der Lexikographen Poezi• Idyllen aus Messina Dionysos-Dithyramben, shkruar 1888, publikuar 1892 Ps. e bana une nje copy/paste, jam qe jam  Bre mâ zi kem' pun't tue shkue Se kto mend vijn' tue u pakue ka vijn' krenat tue u shtue...(Gj.F.) | ||
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  Registered Member #1947 Joined: Tue Jun 03 2008, 06:44pmPosts: 339 | Ah, dashnoret e diturise. Nuk ishte dashnia e zemres se Nices e mjaftueshme per shaken evropiane? happiness | ||
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| Registered Member #1283 Joined: Fri Sep 28 2007, 12:35amPosts: 4466 | Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804) Immanuel Kant was the paradigmatic philosopher of the European Enlightenment. He eradicated the last traces of the medieval worldview from modern philosophy, joined the key ideas of earlier rationalism and empiricism into a powerful model of the subjective origins of the fundamental principles of both science and morality, and laid the ground for much in the philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Above all, Kant was the philosopher of human autonomy, the view that by the use of our own reason in its broadest sense human beings can discover and live up to the basic principles of knowledge and action without outside assistance, above all without divine support or intervention. Kant laid the foundations of his theory of knowledge in his monumental Critique of Pure Reason (1781). He described the fundamental principle of morality in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), in the conclusion of which he famously wrote: Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily reflection is occupied with them: the starry heaven above me and the moral law within me. Neither of them need I seek and merely suspect as if shrouded in obscurity or rapture beyond my own horizon; I see them before me and connect them immediately with my existence. Kant tried to show that both the laws of nature and the laws of morality are grounded in human reason itself. By these two forms of law, however, he is often thought to have defined two incommensurable realms, nature and freedom, the realm of what is and that of what ought to be, the former of which must be limited to leave adequate room for the latter. Kant certainly did devote much space and effort to distinguishing between nature and freedom. But as he also says, in the Critique of Judgment (1790), it is equally important 'to throw a bridge from one territory to the other'. Ultimately, Kant held that both the laws of nature and the laws of free human conduct must be compatible because they are both products of human thought imposed by us on the data of our experience by the exercise of our own powers. This was clearly stated in his last book, The Conflict of the Faculties (1798): Philosophy is not some sort of science of representations, concepts, and ideas, or a science of all sciences, or anything else of this sort; rather, it is a science of the human being, of its representing, thinking, and acting - it should present the human being in all of its components, as it is and ought to be, that is, in accordance with its natural determinations as well as its relationship of morality and freedom. Ancient philosophy adopted an entirely inappropriate standpoint towards the human being in the world, for it made it into a machine in it, which as such had to be entirely dependent on the world or on external things and circumstances; it thus made the human being into an all but merely passive part of the world. Now the critique of reason has appeared and determined the human being to a thoroughly active place in the world. The human being itself is the original creator of all its representations and concepts and ought to be the sole author of all its actions. (7: 69-70) Thus, Kant derived the fundamental principles of human thought and action from human sensibility, understanding, and reason, all as sources of our autonomy; he balanced the contributions of these principles against the ineliminable inputs of external sensation and internal inclination beyond our own control; and he strove both to demarcate these principles from each other and yet to integrate them into a single system with human autonomy as both its foundation and its ultimate value and goal. These were the tasks of Kant's three great critiques. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the essential forms of space, time and conceptual thought arise in the nature of human sensibility and understanding and ground the indispensable principles of human experience. He then argued that reason, in the narrow sense manifest in logical inference, plays a key role in systematizing human experience, but that it is a mistake to think that reason offers metaphysical insight into the existence and nature of the human soul, an independent world, and God. In the Critique of Practical Reason and Groundwork, however, he argued that reason as the source of the ideal of systematicity is the source of the fundamental law of morality and our consciousness of our own freedom, which is the source of all value, and that we can postulate the truth of the fundamental dogmas of Christianity, our own immortality and the existence of God, as practical presuppositions of our moral conduct but not as theoretical truths of metaphysics. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant argued that the unanimity of taste and the systematic organization of both individual organisms and nature as a whole could be postulated, again not as metaphysical dogmas but rather as regulative ideals of our aesthetic and scientific pursuits; he then went on to argue that it is through these ideals that we can tie together the realms of nature and freedom, because aesthetic experience offers us a palpable image of our moral freedom, and a scientific conception of the world as a system of interrelated beings makes sense only as an image of the world as the sphere of our own moral efforts. In many of his last writings, from Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793) to his final manuscripts, the Opus postumum , Kant refined and radicalized his view that our religious conceptions can be understood only as analogies for the nature of human reason itself. The Enlightenment began by attempting to bring even God before the bench of human reason - at the turn of the eighteenth century, both Shaftesbury in Great Britain and Wolff in Germany rejected voluntarism, the theory that God makes eternal truths and moral laws by fiat, and argued instead that we ourselves must know what is right and wrong before we could even recognize supposedly divine commands as divine. Kant completed their argument, concluding that the human being 'creates the elements of knowledge of the world himself, a priori, from which he, as, at the same time, an inhabitant of the world, constructs a world-vision in the idea. | ||
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| Registered Member #1283 Joined: Fri Sep 28 2007, 12:35amPosts: 4466 | Michel Foucault 1. Biographical Sketch Foucault was born in Poitiers, France, on June 15, 1926. His student years seem to have been psychologically tormented but were intellectually brilliant. He became academically established during the 1960s, when he held a series of positions at French universities, before his election in 1969 to the ultra-prestigious Collège de France, where he was Professor of the History of Systems of Thought until his death. From the 1970s on, Foucault was very active politically. He was a founder of the Groupe d'information sur les prisons and often protested on behalf of other marginalized groups. He frequently lectured outside France, particularly in the United States, and in 1983 had agreed to teach annually at the University of California at Berkeley. An early victim of AIDS, Foucault died in Paris on June 25, 1984. It can be difficult to think of Foucault as a philosopher. His academic formation was in psychology and its history as much as in philosophy, his books were mostly histories of medical and social sciences, his passions were literary and political. Nonetheless, almost all of Foucault's works can be fruitfully read as philosophical in either or both of two ways: as a carrying out of philosophy's traditional critical project in a new (historical) manner; and as a critical engagement with the thought of traditional philosophers. This article will present him as a philosopher in these two dimensions. 2. Intellectual Background Let us begin, however, with a sketch of the philosophical environment in which Foucault was educated. He entered the École Normale Supérieure (the standard launching pad for major French philosophers) in 1946, during the heyday of existential phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty, whose lectures he attended, and Heidegger were particularly important. Hegel and Marx were also major concerns, the first through the existential interpretation of his work offered by Jean Hyppolite and the latter through the structuralist reading of Louis Althusser--both teachers who had a strong impact on Foucault at the École Normale. It is, accordingly, not surprising that Foucault's earliest works (his long "Introduction" to Dream and Existence by Ludwig Binswanger, a Heideggerian psychiatrist, and Maladie mentale et personalité, a short book on mental illness) were written in the grip of, respectively, existentialism and Marxism. But he soon turned away quite decisively from both. Although Jean-Paul Sartre, living and working outside the University system, had no personal influence on Foucault, the thought of him, as the French master-thinker preceding Foucault, is always in the background. Like Sartre, Foucault began from a relentless hatred of bourgeois society and culture and with a spontaneous sympathy for groups at the margins of the bourgeoisie (artists, homosexuals, prisoners, etc.). They were also similar in their interests in literature and psychology, as well as philosophy, and both, after a early relative lack of political interest, became strong activists. But in the end Foucault seemed to insist on defining himself in contradiction to Sartre. Philosophically, he rejected what he saw as Sartre's centralization of the subject (which he mocked as "transcendental narcissism"). Personally and politically, he rejected Sartre's role as what Foucault called the "universal intellectual", judging a society in terms of transcendent principles. There is, however, a tincture of protesting too much in Foucault's separation of himself from Sartre, and the question of the relation of their work remains a fertile one. Three other factors were of much more positive significance for the young Foucault. First, there was the French tradition of history and philosophy of science, particularly as represented by Georges Canguilhem, a powerful figure in the French University establishment, whose work in the history and philosophy of biology provided a model for much of what Foucault was later to do in the history of the human sciences. Canguilhem sponsored Foucault's doctoral thesis on the history of madness and, throughout Foucault's career, remained one of his most important and effective supporters. Canguilhem's approach to the history of science (an approach developed from the work of Gaston Bachelard), provided Foucault with a strong sense (Kuhnian avant la lettre) of the discontinuities in scientific history, along with a "rationalist" understanding of the historical role of concepts that made them independent of the phenomenologists' transcendental consciousness. Foucault found this understanding reinforced in the structuralist linguistics and psychology developed, respectively, by Ferdinand de Saussure and Jacques Lacan, as well as in Georges Dumézil's proto-structuralist work on comparative religion. These anti-subjective standpoints provide the context for Foucault's marginalization of the subject in his "structuralist histories", The Birth of the Clinic (on the origins of modern medicine) and The Order of Things (on the origins of the modern human sciences). In a quite different vein, Foucault was enthralled by French avant-garde literature, especially the writings of Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot, where he found the experiential concreteness of existential phenomenology without what he came to see as dubious philosophical assumptions about subjectivity. Of particular interest was this literature's evocation of "limit-experiences", which push us to extremes where conventional categories of intelligibility begin to beak down. This philosophical milieu provided materials for the critique of subjectivity and the corresponding "archaeological" and "genealogical" methods of writing history that inform Foucault's projects of historical critique, to which we now turn. 3. Foucault's Critiques of Historical Reason Since its beginnings with Socrates, philosophy has typically involved the project of questioning the accepted knowledge of the day. Later, Locke, Hume, and especially, Kant developed a distinctively modern idea of philosophy as the critique of knowledge. Kant's great epistemological innovation was to maintain that the same critique that revealed the limits of our knowing powers could also reveal necessary conditions for their exercise. What might have seemed just contingent features of human cognition (for example, the spatial and temporal character of its objects) turn out to be necessary truths. Foucault, however, suggests the need to invert this Kantian move. Rather than asking what, in the apparently contingent, is actually necessary, he suggests asking what, in the apparently necessary, might be contingent. The focus of his questioning is the modern human sciences (biological, psychological, social). These purport to offer universal scientific truths about human nature that are, in fact, often mere expressions of ethical and political commitments of a particular society. Foucault's "critical philosophy" undermines such claims by exhibiting how they are just the outcome of contingent historical forces, and are not scientifically grounded truths. 3.1 History of Madness The most striking example of this mode of Foucault's thought is his first major work, The History of Madness in the Classical Age (1961). This book originated in Foucault's academic study of psychology (a licence de psychologie in 1949 and a diplome de psycho-pathologie in 1952) and his work in a Parisian mental hospital, but it was mainly written during his post-graduate Wanderjahren (1955-59) through a succession of diplomatic/educational posts in Sweden, Germany, and Poland. A study of the emergence of the modern concept of "mental illness" in Europe, The History of Madness is formed from both Foucault's extensive archival work and his intense anger at what he saw as the moral hypocrisy of modern psychiatry. Standard histories saw the nineteenth-century medical treatment of madness (developed from the reforms of Pinel in France and the Tuke brothers in England) as an enlightened liberation of the mad from the ignorance and brutality of preceding ages. But, according to Foucault, the new idea that the mad were merely sick ("mentally" ill) and in need of medical treatment was not at all a clear improvement on earlier conceptions (e.g., the Renaissance idea that the mad were in contact with the mysterious forces of cosmic tragedy or the 17th-18th-century view of madness as a renouncing of reason). Moreover, he argued that the alleged scientific neutrality of modern medical treatments of insanity are in fact covers for controlling challenges to a conventional bourgeois morality. In short, Foucault argued that what was presented as an objective, incontrovertible scientific discovery (that madness is mental illness) was in fact the product of eminently questionable social and ethical commitments. Foucault's next history, The Birth of the Clinic (1963) can similarly be read as a critique of modern clinical medicine. But the socio-ethical critique is muted (except for a few vehement passages), presumably because there is a substantial core of objective truth in medicine (as opposed to psychiatry) and so less basis for critique. As a result The Birth of the Clinic is much closer to a standard history of science, in the tradition of Canguilhem's history of concepts. The same is true of The Order of Things, which was controversial much more for its philosophical attacks on phenomenology (and Marxism) than for its complex and nuanced critique of the human sciences. But Foucault returns with full force to social critique in Discipline and Punish. 3.2 Archaeology and Genealogy Discipline and Punish marks the transition to what commentators generally characterize as Foucault's "genealogical" period, in contrast to the preceding "archaeological" period. In 1969, he published The Archaeology of Knowledge, a methodological treatise that explicitly formulates what he took to be the implicit historical approach ("archaeology") he deployed in The History of Madness, The Birth of the Clinic, and The Order of Things. The premise of the archaeological method is that systems of thought and knowledge (epistemes or discursive formations, in Foucault's terminology) are governed by rules, beyond those of grammar and logic, that operate beneath the consciousness of individual subjects and define a system of conceptual possibilities that determines the boundaries of thought in a given domain and period. So, for example, The History of Madness should, Foucault maintained, be read as an intellectual excavation of the radically different discursive formations that governed talk and thought about madness from the 17th through the 19th centuries. (Admittedly, his archaeological method was only adumbrated in this early work, but it was fully developed in The Order of Things.) Archaeology was an essential method for Foucault because it supported a historiography that did not rest on the primacy of the consciousness of individual subjects; it allowed the historian of thought to operate at an unconscious level that displaced the primacy of the subject found in both phenomenology and in traditional historiography. However, archaeology's critical force was restricted to the comparison of the different discursive formations of different periods. Such comparisons could suggest the contingency of a given way of thinking by showing that previous ages had thought very differently (and, apparently, with as much effectiveness). But mere archaeological analysis could say nothing about the causes of the transition from one way of thinking to another and so had to ignore perhaps the most forceful case for the contingency of entrenched contemporary positions. Genealogy, the new method deployed in Discipline and Punish, was intended to remedy this deficiency. Foucault intended the term "genealogy" to evoke Nietzsche's genealogy of morals, particularly with its suggestion of complex, mundane, inglorious origins -- in no way part of any grand scheme of progressive history. The point of a genealogical analysis is to show that a given system of thought (itself uncovered in its essential structures by archaeology, which therefore remains part of Foucault's historiography) was the result of contingent turns of history, not the outcome of rationally inevitable trends. 3.3 History of the Prison Discipline and Punish (1975)is a genealogical study of the development of the "gentler" modern way of imprisoning criminals rather than torturing or killing them. While recognizing the element of genuinely enlightened reform, Foucault particularly emphasizes how such reform also becomes a vehicle of more effective control: "to punish less, perhaps; but certainly to punish better". He further argues that the new mode of punishment becomes the model for control of an entire society, with factories, hospitals, and schools modeled on the modern prison. We should not, however, think that the deployment of this model was due to the explicit decisions of some central controlling agency. In typically genealogical fashion, Foucault's analysis shows how techniques and institutions, developed for different and often quite innocuous purposes, converged to create the modern system of disciplinary power. At the core of Foucault's picture of modern "disciplinary" society are three primary techniques of control: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination. To a great extent, control over people (power) can be achieved merely by observing them. So, for example, the tiered rows of seats in a stadium not only makes it easy for spectators to see but also for guards or security cameras to scan the audience. A perfect system of observation would allow one "guard" to see everything (a situation approximated, as we shall see, in Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon). But since this is not usually possible, there is a need for "relays" of observers, hierarchically ordered, through whom observed data passes from lower to higher levels. A distinctive feature of modern power (disciplinary control) is its concern with what people have not done (nonobservence), with, that is, a person's failure to reach required standards. This concern illustrates the primary function of modern disciplinary systems: to correct deviant behavior. The goal is not revenge (as in the case of the tortures of premodern punishment) but reform, where, of course, reform means coming to live by society's standards or norms. Discipline through imposing precise norms ("normalization") is quite different from the older system of judicial punishment, which merely judges each action as allowed by the law or not allowed by the law and does not say that those judged are "normal" or "abnormal". This idea of normalization is pervasive in our society: e.g., national standards for educational programs, for medical practice, for industrial processes and products. The examination (for example, of students in schools, of patients in hospitals) is a method of control that combines hierarchical observation with normative judgment. It is a prime example of what Foucault calls power/knowledge, since it combines into a unified whole "the deployment of force and the establishment of truth" (184). It both elicits the truth about those who undergo the examination (tells what they know or what is the state of their health) and controls their behavior (by forcing them to study or directing them to a course of treatment). On Foucault's account, the relation of power and knowledge is far closer than in the familiar Baconian engineering model, for which "knowledge is power" means that knowledge is an instrument of power, although the two exist quite independently. Foucault's point is rather than, at least for the study of human beings, the goals of power and the goals of knowledge cannot be separated: in knowing we control and in controlling we know. The examination also situates individuals in a "field of documentation". The results of exams are recorded in documents that provide detailed information about the individuals examined and allow power systems to control them (e.g., absentee records for schools, patients' charts in hospitals). On the basis of these records, those in control can formulate categories, averages, and norms that are in turn a basis for knowledge. The examination turns the individual into a "case"--in both senses of the term: a scientific example and an object of care; caring is always also an opportunity for control. Bentham's Panopticon is, for Foucault, an ideal architectural model of modern disciplinary power. It is a design for a prison, built so that each inmate is separated from and invisible to all the others (in separate "cells") and each inmate is always visible to a monitor situated in a central tower. Monitors will not in fact always see each inmate; the point is that they could at any time. Since inmates never know whether they are being observed, they must act as if they are always objects of observation. As a result, control is achieved more by the internal monitoring of those controlled than by heavy physical constraints. The principle of the Panopticon can be applied not only to prisons but to any system of disciplinary power (a factory, a hospital, a school). And, in fact, although Bentham himself was never able to build it, its principle has come to pervade every aspect of modern society. It is the instrument through which modern discipline has replaced pre-modern sovereignty (kings, judges) as the fundamental power relation. 3.4 History of Modern Sexuality Foucault's history of sexuality was originally projected as a fairly straightforward extension of the genealogical approach of Discipline and Punish to the topic of sexuality. Foucault's idea is that the various modern bodies of knowledge about sexuality (various "sciences of sexuality", including psychoanalysis) have an intimate association with the power structures of modern society and so are prime candidates for genealogical analysis. The first volume of this project, published in 1976, was intended as the introduction to a series of studies on particular aspects of modern sexuality (children, women, "perverts", population, etc.) It outlined the project of the overall history, explaining the basic viewpoint and the methods to be used. On Foucault's account, modern control of sexuality parallels modern control of criminality by making sex (like crime) an object of allegedly scientific disciplines, which simultaneously offer knowledge and domination of their objects. However, it becomes apparent that there is a further dimension in the power associated with the sciences of sexuality. Not only is there control exercised via others' knowledge of individuals; there is also control via individuals' knowledge of themselves. Individuals internalize the norms laid down by the sciences of sexuality and monitor themselves in an effort to conform to these norms. Thus, they are controlled not only as objects of disciplines but also as self-scrutinizing and self-forming subjects. For all their interest and importance, Foucault's critiques are not so much philosophy in the traditional sense as they are a matter of achieving a traditional philosophical goal -- the critique of contemporary claims to knowledge -- by new (historical) means. There are, however, also aspects of his work that directly engage standard philosophical topics, particular those tied to the central epistemological issue of representation. In particular, he offers, in The Order of Things, a detailed analysis of the question of representation from Descartes through Kant. This is, far and away, his most sustained piece of traditionally philosophical analysis and as such deserves our close attention. 4. Representation in Modern Philosophy For Foucault, representation is not just one of many modern philosophical problems. Like many interpreters, he regards philosophical thought from Descartes on centering on the problem of knowledge. More distinctively (but consistent with the views of, for example, Heidegger), he sees representation as at the heart of the question of knowledge. 4.1 Classical Representation Foucault argues that from Descartes up to Kant (during what the French call the Classical Age), representation was simply identified with thought: to think just was to employ ideas to represent the object of thought. But, he says, we need to be clear about what it meant for an idea to represent an object. This was not, first of all, any sort of relation of resemblance: there were no features (properties) of the idea that themselves constituted the representation of the object. (Saying this, however, does not require that the idea itself have no properties or even that these properties are not relevant to the idea's representation of the object.) By contrast, during the Renaissance, knowledge was understood as a matter of resemblance between signs. The map is a useful model of Classical representation. It consists, for example, of a set of lines of varying widths, lengths, and colors, and thereby represent the roads in and around a city. This is not because the roads have the properties of the map (the widths, lengths, and colors of the lines) but because the abstract structure given in the map (the relations among the lines) duplicate the abstract structure of the roads. At the heart of Classical thought is the principle that we know in virtue of having ideas that, in this sense, represent what we know. Of course, in contrast to the map, we do not need to know what the actual features of our ideas are in virtue of which they are able to represent. (In Descartes' scholastic terminology, we do not need to know their "formal reality".) We need to know only the abstract structure that they share with the things they represent (the structure of what Descartes calls their "objective reality"). We do, however, have direct (introspective) access to the abstract structures of our ideas: we can "see" what representational structure they have. Further, we can alter an idea's structure to make it a better representation of an object, as we can alter a map to improve it. How, on the Classical view, do we know that an idea is a representation of an object--and an adequate representation? Not, Foucault argues, by comparing the idea with the object as it is apart from its representation. This is impossible, since it would require knowing the object without a representation (when, for Classical thought, to know is to represent). The only possibility is that the idea itself must make it apparent that it is a representation. The idea represents the very fact that it is a representation. As to the question of whether an idea is a representation, this "self-referential" feature is all there is to it. As to adequacy, it must be that some subset of ideas likewise bear witness to their own adequacy--as, for example, Descartes' "clear and distinct perceptions" or Hume's simple impressions. In this sense, early modern philosophy must always be based on "intuition" (intellectual or sensory). Note, however, that an "intuition" of an idea's adequacy does not, of itself, establish the independent existence of the object represented by the idea. As far as the early modern view is concerned, there may be no such objects; or, if there are, this needs to be established by some other means (e.g., an argument or some other sort of intuition). We see, then, that for Foucault the key to Classical knowing is the idea; that is, mental representation. Classical thinkers could disagree about the actual ontological status of ideas (their formal reality); but they all had to agree that as representations (epistemically, if not ontologically) they were "non-physical" and "non-historical"; that is, precisely as representing their objects, they could not be conceived as having any role in the causal networks of the natural or the human worlds. From this it further followed that language--precisely as a physical and/or historical reality--could have no fundamental role in knowledge. Language could be nothing more than a higher-order instrument of thought: a physical representation of ideas, having no meaning except in relation to them. 4.2. Kant's Critique of Classical Representation Foucault maintains that the great "turn" in modern philosophy occurs when, with Kant (though no doubt he is merely an example of something much broader and deeper), it becomes possible to raise the question of whether ideas do in fact represent their objects and, if so, how (in virtue of what) they do so. In other words, ideas are no longer taken as the unproblematic vehicles of knowledge; it is now possible to think that knowledge might be (or have roots in) something other than representation. This did not mean that representation had nothing at all to do with knowledge. Perhaps some (or even all) knowledge still essentially involved ideas' representing objects. But, Foucault insists, the thought that was only now (with Kant) possible was that representation itself (and the ideas that represented) could have an origin in something else. This thought, according to Foucault, led to some important and distinctively modern possibilities. The first was that developed by Kant himself, who thought that representations (thoughts or ideas) were themselves the product of ("constituted" by) the mind. Not, however, produced by the mind as a natural or historical reality, but as belonging to a special epistemic realm: transcendental subjectivity. Kant thus maintained the Classical insistence that knowledge cannot be understood as a physical or historical reality, but he located the grounds of knowledge in a domain (the transcendental) more fundamental than the ideas it subtended. (We must add, of course, that Kant also did not think of this domain as possessing a reality beyond the historical and the physical; it was not metaphysical. But this metaphysical alternative was explored by the idealistic metaphysics that followed Kant) Another--and in some ways more typically modern--view was that ideas were themselves historical realities. This could be most plausibly developed by making ideas essentially tied to language (as in, for example, Herder), now regarded as the primary (and historicized) vehicle of knowledge. But such an approach was not viable in its pure form, since to make knowledge entirely historical would deprive it of any normative character and so destroy its character as knowledge. In other words, even when modern thought makes knowledge essentially historical, it must retain some functional equivalent of Kant's transcendental realm to guarantee the normative validity of knowledge. 4.3 Language and "Man" At this point, The Order of Things introduces the two central features of thought after Kant: the return of language and the "birth of man". Our discussion above readily explains why Foucault talks of a return of language: it now has an independent and essential role that it couldn't have as the mere instrument of Classical ideas. But the return is not a monolithic phenomenon. Language is related to knowledge in diverse ways, and to each there corresponds a distinctive sort of "return". So, for example, the history of natural languages has introduced confusions and distortions that we can try to eliminate through techniques of formalization. On the other hand, this same history may have deposited fundamental truths in our languages that we can unearth only by the methods of hermeneutic interpretation. (So these two apparently opposed approaches -- underlying the division of analytic and continental philosophy -- are in fact, according to Foucault, complementary projects of modern thought.) But there is yet another possibility: freed from its subordination to ideas, language can be treated (as it had been in the Renaissance) as an autonomous reality -- indeed as even more deeply autonomous than Renaissance language, since there is no system of resemblances binding it to the world. In this sense, language is a truth unto itself, speaking nothing other than its own meaning. This is the realm of "pure literature", evoked by Mallarmé when he answered Nietzsche's (genealogical) question, "Who is speaking?" with, "Language itself". In contrast to the Renaissance, however, there is no divine Word underlying and giving unique truth to the words of language. Literature is literally nothing but language -- or rather many languages, speaking for and of themselves. Even more important than language is the figure of man. The most important point about "man" is that it is an epistemological concept. Man, Foucault says, did not exist during the Classical age (or before). This is not because there was no idea of human beings as a species or of human nature as a psychological, moral, or political notion. Rather, "there was no epistemological consciousness of man as such" (The Order of Things, 309). But even "epistemological" needs construal. There is no doubt that even in the Classical age human beings were conceived as the locus of knowledge (i.e., it is humans who possessed the ideas that represented the world). Man, on the other hand, is an epistemological notion in the Kantian sense of a transcendental subject that is also an empirical object. For the Classical age, men are the locus of representations but not, as for Kant, their source. There is, in Classical thought, no room for the modern notion of "constitution". Foucault illustrates his point through a striking discussion of Descartes' cogito, showing why it is an indubitable certitude within the classical episteme, but not within the modern episteme. There are two ways of questioning the force of the cogito. One is to suggest that the subject (the thinking self, the I) that Descartes concludes exists is something more than just the act of representing objects; so we can't go from representation to a thinker. But for the Classical Age this makes no sense, since thinking is representation. A second criticism would be that the self as representer may not be "really real" but merely the "product of" (constituted by) a mind that is real in a fuller sense. But this objection has weight only if we can think of this "more real" mind as having the self as an object in some sense other than representing it. (Otherwise, there is no basis for saying that the self as representer is "less real".) But, once again, this is precisely what cannot be thought in Classical terms. 4.4 The Analytic of Finitude At the very heart of man is his finitude: the fact that, as described by the modern empirical sciences, he is limited by the various historical forces (organic, economic, linguistic) operating on him. This finitude is a philosophical problem because, this same historically limited empirical being must also somehow be the source of the representations whereby we know the empirical world, including ourselves as empirical beings. I (my consciousness) must, as Kant put it, be both an empirical object of representation and the transcendental source of representations. How is this possible? Foucault's view is that, in the end, it isn't -- and that the impossibility (historically realized) means the collapse of the modern episteme. What Foucault calls the "analytic of finitude" sketches the historical case for this conclusion, examining the major efforts (together making up the heart of modern philosophy) to answer the question. The question -- and the basic strategy for answering it -- go back, of course, to Kant, who put forward the following crucial idea: that the very factors that make us finite (our subjection to space, time, causality, etc.) are also conditions necessary for the possibility of knowledge. Our finitude is, therefore, simultaneously founded and founding (positive and fundamental, as Foucault puts it). The project of modern (Kantian and post-Kantian) philosophy -- the analytic of finitude -- is to show how this is possible. Some modern philosophy tries to resolve the problem of man by, in effect, reducing the transcendental to the empirical. For example, positivism attempts to explain knowledge in terms of natural science (physics, biology), while Marxism appeals to historical social sciences. (The difference is that the first grounds knowledge in the past -- e.g., an evolutionary history -- whereas the second grounds it in a revolutionary future that will transcend the limitations of ideology.) Either approach simply ignores the terms of the problem: that man must be regarded as irreducibly both empirical and transcendental. It might seem that Husserl's phenomenology has carried out the Kantian project of synthesizing man as object and man as subject by radicalizing the Cartesian project; that is, by grounding our knowledge of empirical truths in the reality of the transcendental subject. The problem, however, is that the modern notion of man excludes Descartes' idea of the cogito as a "sovereign transparency" of pure consciousness. Thought is no longer pure representation and therefore cannot be separated from an "unthought" (i.e., the given empirical and historical truths about who we are). I can no longer go from "I think" to "I am" because the content of my reality (what I am) is always more than the content of any merely thinking self (I am, e.g., living, working, and speaking--and all these take me beyond the realm of mere thought). Or, putting the point in the reverse way, if we use "I" to denote my reality simply as a conscious being, then I "am not" much of what I (as a self in the world) am. As a result, to the extent that Husserl has grounded everything in the transcendental subject, this is not the subject (cogito) of Descartes but the modern cogito, which includes the (empirical) unthought that is part of man's reality. Phenomenology, like all modern thought, must accept the unthought as the ineliminable "other" of man. Nor are the existential phenomenologists (Sartre and Merleau-Ponty) able to solve the problem. Unlike Husserl, they avoid positing a transcendental ego and instead focus on the concrete reality of man-in-the world. But this, Foucault claims, is just a more subtle way of reducing the transcendental to the empirical. Finally, some philosophers (Hegel and Marx in one way, Nietzsche and Heidegger in another) have tried to resolve the problem of man's dual status by treating him as a historical reality. But this move encounters the difficulty that man has to be both a product of historical processes and the origin of history. If we treat man as a product, we find ourselves reducing his reality to something non-human (this is what Foucault calls the "retreat" from man's origin). But if we insist on a "return" to man as his own proper origin, then we can no longer make sense of his place in the empirical world. This paradox may explain the endless modern obsession with origins, but there is never any way out of the contradiction between man as originator and man as originated. Nonetheless, Foucault thinks that the modern pursuit of the question of origins has provided us with a deeper sense of the ontological significance of time, particularly in the thought of Nietzsche and Heidegger, who reject Hegel's and Marx's view of the return to our origin as a redemptive fullness of being, and instead see it as a confrontation with the nothingness of our existence. 5. Philosophy and Ancient Sexuality Foucault's final engagement with traditional philosophy arises from the rather surprising turn toward the ancient world he took in the last few years of his life. The History of Sexuality had been planned as a multi-volume work on various themes in a study of modern sexuality. The first volume, discussed above, was a general introduction. Foucault wrote, but never published, a second volume (The Confessions of the Flesh) that dealt with the origins of the modern notion of the subject in the practices of Christian confession. His concern was that a proper understanding of the Christian development required a comparison with ancient conceptions of the ethical self, something he undertook in his last two books (1984) on Greek and Roman sexuality: The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self . These treatments of ancient sexuality moved Foucault into ethical issues that had been implicit but seldom explicitly thematized in his earlier writings. His specific goal was to compare ancient pagan and Christian ethics through the test-case of sexuality and to trace the development of Christian ideas about sex from the very different ideas of the ancients. On Foucault's account the great contrast was between the Christian view that sexual acts were, on the whole, evil in themselves and the Greek view that they were goods, natural and necessary, though subject to abuse. As a result, instead of the Christian moral code forbidding most forms of sexual activity (and severely restricting the rest), the ancient Greeks emphasized the proper use (chresis) of pleasures, where this involved engaging in the full range of sexual activities (heterosexual, homosexual, in marriage, out of marriage), but with proper moderation. So understood, sex for the Greeks was a major part of what Foucault called an "aesthetics of the self": the self's creation of a beautiful and enjoyable existence. These studies of ancient sexuality, and, particularly, the idea of an aesthetics of the self, led Foucault to the ancient idea of philosophy as a way of life rather than a search for theoretical truth. Although there is some discussion in The Use of Pleasure of Plato's conception of philosophy, Foucault's treatments of the topic are primarily in lectures (in the 1980s) at the Collège de France and at Berkeley; he had no time to develop them for publication. In the Collège de France lectures, he discusses Socrates (in the Apology and in Alcibiades I) as both a model and a exponent of a philosophical life focused on "care of the self" and follows the subsequent ancient discussions of this topic in, for example, Epictetus, Seneca, and Plutarch. The Berkeley lectures deal with the ancient ideal of "truthful speaking" (parrhesia), regarded as a central political and moral virtue. Here Foucault discusses earlier formulations of the notion, in Euripides and Socrates, as well as its later transformations by the Epicureans, Stoics, and Cynics. These two sets of lectures provide rich materials for what might well have been the most fruitful of all Foucault's engagements with traditional philosophy. But his early death in 1984 prevented him from completing the project. | ||
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♠ •° ∂ι gισяиσ тι ρєиѕσ ∂ι иσттє тι ѕσgиσ •°♠  Registered Member #2419 Joined: Fri Oct 31 2008, 01:26pmPosts: 1274 | Il più grande filosofo di tutti i tempi Il filosofo è colui che ama la verità, che vuole essere vicino alla verità. Ma cosa è la verità? Una possibile definizione di verità riguarda la genuinità: vero è ciò che non è alterato, mediato, trasformato, interpretato. Il 26 febbraio 1970 uscì nelle sale il film Il ragazzo selvaggio (L’Enfant sauvage) di François Truffaut. Il film è il seguito ideale de I quattrocento colpi (Les Quatre Cents Coups, 1959); entrambi i film trattano l’importante tema dell’infanzia e dell’educazione, e contengono una non banale analisi, decisamente critica, della società. Il ragazzo selvaggio è Victor di Aveyron. Nato intorno al 1790 nella regione dell’Averyon, nel sud della Francia, Victor venne abbandonato quando aveva verosimilmente due anni: cresciuto come un animale nella foresta, l’8 gennaio del 1800 venne scoperto e catturato da alcuni cacciatori. Dopo varie traversie e alcune fughe, l’anno seguente venne affidato alle cure del medico Jean Itard, che cercò di educarlo principalmente insegnandogli a parlare. Nonostante Victor non fosse sordo o mentalmente ritardato, riuscì ad apprendere praticamente solo due parole: Lait e Oh Dieu, Latte e Oh Dio, in ogni caso con diversi problemi di pronuncia. È possibile leggere, in francese, il rapporto che il dottor Itard redasse nel 1806. Il ragazzo selvaggio morì nel 1828. La storia di Victor si intreccia con il dibattito, nato con l’illuminismo, sulla razionalità dell’umana, se essa sia frutto dell’apprendimento oppure se sia innata e naturale. Per molti scienziati il suo ritrovamento fu la possibilità di sperimentare le proprie teorie sul campo, e lo sfortunato ragazzo venne spesso considerato più come una cavia che come una persona. Victor, nel suo mutismo, è incapace di mentire, non è in grado di alterare il naturale corso delle cose. Non interpreta, non trasforma il mondo: si limita a vivere in esso, lasciandosi permeare dalla verità delle cose. Se il filosofo è colui che ama la verità e che vuole esservi vicino, allora Victor è il più grande filosofo di tutti i tempi: conosce la verità nella sua forma più pura ed assoluta. ████─████─████─████─█──███──█─ ────█ █────█──█─█────█──█─█─█───█─█─ ────█ ████─████─████─█────█─█████─█─ ────█ ───█─█────█────█──█─█─█───█─█ ████─█────████─████─█─█───█─██ ██──█- | ||
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| Registered Member #1283 Joined: Fri Sep 28 2007, 12:35amPosts: 4466 | John Locke (1632-1704) Although he completed a philosophical education at Oxford, John Locke declined the offer of a permanent academic position in order to avoid committing himself to a religious order. Having also studied medicine, he served for many years as private physician and secretary to Anthony Ashley Cooper, the first Earl of Shaftesbury and one of the Lord Proprietors of the Carolina Colonies. Locke's involvement with this controversial political figure led to a period of self-imposed exile in Holland during the 1680s, but after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 he held several minor governmental offices. A friend of Isaac Newton and Robert Boyle, Locke was also an early member of the Royal Society. He studied and wrote on philosophical, scientific, and political matters throughout his life, in a voluminous correspondence and ample journals, but the public works for which he is best known were published in a single, sudden burst. The fundamental principles of Locke's philosophy are presented in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), the culmination of twenty years of reflection on the origins of human knowledge. According to Locke, what we know is always properly understood as the relation between ideas, and he devoted much of the Essay to an extended argument that all of our ideas—simple or complex—are ultimately derived from experience. The consequence of this empiricist approach is that the knowledge of which we are capable is severely limited in its scope and certainty. Our knowledge of material substances, for example, depends heavily on the secondary qualities by reference to which we name them, while their real inner natures derive from the primary qualities of their insensible parts. Nevertheless, Locke held that we have no grounds for complaint about the limitations of our knowledge, since a proper application of our cognitive capacities is enough to guide our action in the practical conduct of life. The Essay brought great fame, and Locke spent much of the rest of his life responding to admirers and critics by making revisions in later editions of the book, including detailed accounts of human volition and moral freedom, the personal identity on which our responsibility as moral agents depends, and the dangers of religious enthusiasm. One additional section that was never included in the Essay itself is Of the Conduct of the Understanding, a practical guide to the achievement of useful beliefs about the world. The bachelor philosopher's notions about childrearing appeared in Some Thoughts concerning Education (1693). By contrast, Locke chose to avoid controversy by publishing his political writings anonymously. With the Two Treatises of Civil Government (1690) Locke established himself as a political theorist of the highest order. The First Treatise is a detailed refutation of the (now-forgotten) monarchist theories of Robert Filmer, but the Second Treatise of Government offers a systematic account of the foundations of political obligation. On Locke's view, all rights begin in the individual property interest created by an investment of labor. The social structure or commonwealth, then, depends for its formation and maintenance on the express consent of those who are governed by its political powers. Majority rule thus becomes the cornerstone of all political order, and dissatisfied citizens reserve a lasting right to revolution. | ||
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 Registered Member #2627 Joined: Mon Feb 09 2009, 07:09amPosts: 2846 | Filozof't ma te medhej: -Sokrates -Plato -Aristote -Plotin -St.Augustinus (Pater Ecclesiae) -St.Ambrosius (Pater Ecclesiae) -Boethius -Petrus Lombardus -Petrus Aebelardus -Albertus Magnus et dulcis in fundo -St.Bonaventura -St.Thomas de Aquino (Doctor Ecclesiae, Doctor Angelicus) Philo-sophia= Dashnor i ditunise. Hitleri filozof? Per ta kuptuar qe Hitleri eshte Filozof, fillimisht te duhet te lexosh "Meine Kampf"-"Lufta Ime" (nuk e di nese ekzizton ne Shqip). Adolf Hitler futet ne kategorine e Filozofise Politike (Political Philosophy), ashtu sic kemi Filozofi ekonomike, familjare, fetare etj. Perpara se te behej Diktator, Hitleri ka qene Artist. Ai nuk ishte vetem nje tiran ashtu sic portretizohet sot, per me shume ai ishte Filozof. Nazismi ne vetvete eshte Ideologji Politike. Ne kete ideologji shprehen me se miri shume ide dhe parime Filozofike te pashprehura me pare nga ndonje tjeter. Po te shohesh ne fund te librit "Meine Kampf" do te gjesh emrat e librave te cilet Hitleri ka cituar ne librin e tij. Emrat e Nices, Marksit, apo Hegelit do te jene aty, keshtu kjo eshte nje fakt me shume qe libri i tij ka karakter Filozofik. [ Edited Tue May 26 2009, 09:03am ] Dashuria esht buka engjejve, therrmiet shpresa njerzimit. | ||
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| Registered Member #1947 Joined: Tue Jun 03 2008, 06:44pmPosts: 339 | Se besoj se Augustinus mundet me mesu kend shume. Te gjithe kane karakter filozofik. Varet se si varion dashnia per dituni nga personi ne person. Mjafton deshira e sinqerte me dasht ditunine per me tu ngjit llagapi 'filozof'. Kapaciteti dhe saktesia ne hulumtimet e ceshtjeve te ndryshme eshte tjeter gje. [ Edited Thu Jul 16 2009, 06:15pm ] happiness | ||
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Just, SMILE Registered Member #699 Joined: Fri Apr 20 2007, 07:20pmPosts: 3824 | Filozofi ma i madh? - Cdo person qe takon perdite, e te meson dicka nga jeta e tij. Pa shume "llafe", MIND-OF-THE-WONDERFUL "Info:fcb- Qendra e Këshillimit dhe Shërbimeve Psikologjike, Shkodër Shqipëri Cel: +355 67 30 17 299; email: -email- | ||
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